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Introduction
Directors' principal functions can be classified into two broadly defined roles: one internally focused and the other externally directed (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) . Internally, directors are responsible for policy setting and monitoring managers' actions (Fama 1980 , Fama and Jensen 1983 , Mizruchi 1983 ). Externally, directors facilitate better access to important resources in the firm's environment (Pfeffer 1972, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . The latter role is particularly important to entrepreneurial firms Dalton 1992, 1993) for which establishing ties with other entities in their environment is typically more difficult than for established firms (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . As argued by Stinchcombe (1965) , the inability of young organizations to develop relations with potential stakeholders is a major determinant of their relatively high mortality rate or the "liability of newness."
Outside directors can facilitate access to resources in the firm's environment not only by providing direct connections to important entities (e.g., Mizruchi 1996) , but also, in some contexts, by playing a symbolic role that is independent of their tangible activities (Certo 2003) . Specifically, reputable outside directors can help establish the legitimacy the young firm often lacks by acting as signaling mechanism (Selznick 1949, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . These prestigious individuals can provide cues to the firm's environment regarding different aspects of the firm, such as its social responsibility (Schoorman et al. 1981) , wealth, and value (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978 
Renting a Reputation
Economic agents frequently must contract with each other without full information about important characteristics of the other party. For example, buyers may not know the quality of the product a seller offers, employees may be uncertain about the quality of a prospective employer's work environment, and investors may have little knowledge of the likely profitability of a new company. These informational asymmetries may lead to market failure (Akerlof 1970) . When markets are vulnerable to this kind of failure, it is in many parties' interests to find ways to communicate the missing information. In particular, firms that are "better" than average would benefit if their potential stakeholders had this information. The literature on asymmetric information has suggested a number of mechanisms to correct this problem, including the use of reputational mechanisms (Spence 1974) . Stakeholders, for example, often rely on a firm's reputation when making investment, product, and career decisions (Dowling 1986 ).
Reputation can be thought of as a probability that the firm is of a certain type or will act in a certain way (e.g., Shapiro 1983 , Tadelis 1999 Lacking their own reputations, young firms may be able to "rent" the reputations of other agents to enhance their own legitimacy and positions in the market. The reputable agent then serves as a middleman between the firm and the stakeholder. In markets where an adverse selection problem exists, the assurance given by a middleman is important to reduce inefficiencies and market failures (Biglaiser 1993 Amit et al. 1990 Amit et al. , 1993 .
A central hypothesis of this paper is that reputable outside directors can also provide cues regarding the firms' attributes (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Indeed, we believe outside directors may be particularly well qualified to efficiently signal information to stakeholders. The advantages of outside directors over inside directors and other possible signalers at communicating information about the potential profitability of firms have two main sources. First, as directors they have access to a great deal of inside information about the firm and the ability to compel its provision. Anyone operating from a position outside the firm would have difficulty securing this kind of access to important information. Second, they need not be very expensive (relative to the benefit derived) because the amount of time required of even a conscientious outside director is not that great compared, for example, to the time required of a management team.
In addition, we think it is important that, unlike the aforementioned middlemen, reputable outside directors cannot only signal a firm's financial attributes but also enhance its overall visibility and provide assurance about a wide range of nonfinancial qualities, such as environmental responsibility or ethical conduct. For example, Gilead Sciences, a biotech firm, gained attention by including in their board a then former secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and a former secretary of state, George Schultz (Stuart et al. 1999). Exxon, an oil company, appointed as an outside director a renowned oceanographer-ecologist, and MP3.com, an online music company, appointed as an outside director a former California Court of Appeals justice. Given the backgrounds of these individuals, we believe the firms may have been trying to signal qualities other than just profitability.
Despite the growing interest in directors' signaling role (e.g., Certo 2003 , Certo et al. 2001 , Finkel 1998 , to the best of our knowledge no analytical model has been developed to examine this role to date. As a result, we lack understanding when signaling with reputable directors is a feasible strategy and what factors determine its effectiveness. As a first step towards filling this gap, we have developed a signaling model in which new ventures "rent" the reputational capital of outside directors to credibly signal their attributes. Notably, in this model we recognize that, unlike other middlemen (such as venture capitalists, auditors, and investment bankers), outside directors can also be used to signal nonfinancial attributes of the firm. Therefore, in contrast to other adverse selection models, our model does not require that directors' signal will necessarily separate among firms on the basis of financial performance.
The Model
Our model is one of adverse selection, in which stakeholders are cautious in aligning themselves with new ventures about which they lack important information. Young firms, on the other hand, need to attract stakeholders (including customers, employees, joint venture partners, etc.) to operate profitably.
We consider a population of new ventures in which there are two types of new ventures, which, for expositional convenience, we label "good" and "bad." A new venture's type is solely determined here from the stakeholders' point of view, and will depend upon the attribute the particular stakeholder cares about most. Potential investors, for example, will define a new venture as "good" if its expected profitability is higher than that of other firms, whereas potential employees will define a new venture as "good" if its expected employment conditions are better than those of other firms.
A stakeholder takes some risk in committing to a firm, as doing so requires an irreversible investment. We assume that investments in "bad" new ventures are completely lost, but this is a normalization. The important consideration is that the return is sufficiently low to warrant withdrawal from the commitment. However, both "bad" and "good" firms need to attract stakeholders to make profits. If the proportion of good new ventures in the population is high enough, the expected gain to forming a relationship with the firm (yA) will equal or exceed the investment made (I). Stakeholders should thus be willing to gamble on finding a good firm in a random draw from the population of firms if y > I/A (note that because we expect the benefits, A, to exceed the investment, I, we have 0 < I/A < 1). In this case, all young firms, good or bad, will be able to attract stakeholders. Here, the stakeholders' lack of information regarding the new venture's type does not affect the survival rate of new ventures.
When the perceived proportion of good new ventures in the population lies below the critical level (i.e., if y( < I/A), stakeholders will not be willing to invest without more information about firm quality. In the absence of mechanisms to address this situation, the familiar adverse selection problem (see Akerlof 1970) will cause this market to fail. No young firm, good or bad, will be able to attract stakeholders. Clearly, good new ventures have an incentive to try to distinguish themselves from bad new ventures. Note that the critical level of y will depend on the costs of the stakeholder's investment (I) and the benefits if the new venture is a good one (A), in fairly obvious ways. The lower the required investment, and the higher the benefit, the higher will be the willingness of the stakeholders to establish relations with new firms. Neither good nor bad new ventures will choose to hire outside directors for signaling purposes. All new ventures will be able to attract stakeholders.
Directors as Signaling Vehicles
From this point on, we address in this model the more interesting case related to conditions under which directors can be helpful as a way to reduce the adverse selection problem. Under certain conditions, good firms may be able to pay such a high premium to directors that bad firms will not be able to match it. While this premium raises the cost of hiring a director, it can also credibly signal the firm's quality, allowing the good firm to attract stakeholders and operate where this would not otherwise have been possible. This is established in Proposition 2. The hiring of a director in this case is a means by which a good firm can signal its type by "burning money" in a way analogous to the use of advertising to signal quality in the model of Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) . In this equilibrium, good firms pay so much that bad firms cannot profitably imitate them. The equilibrium is supported by the belief by stakeholders that any director receiving a wage less than W* must be attached to a bad firm.
It is worth noting two points about Proposition 2. First, in this equilibrium, while investments are all DEUTSCH AND ROSS You Are Known by the Directors You Keep: Directors as a Signaling Mechanism ex post profitable for stakeholders, we do not achieve the full-information, first-best outcome, as the signaling is costly. Second, if it were the case that R < W, the signal would be so costly that no firm would hire a director, and market failure would thus occur.
The separating equilibrium of Proposition 2 is not the only equilibrium possible when y < I/A, R > W and R> r. Depending on the beliefs held by stakeholders, there may also be a pooling equilibrium in which no firm can attract stakeholders. However, as described in Proposition 3, the pooling equilibrium is vulnerable to the refinement developed by Cho and Kreps (1987) and is referred to as the "Intuitive Criterion." PROPOSITION 3. In the model with directors, if y < I/A, R > W, and R > r, a pooling equilibrium also exists in which no firms attract stakeholders. This equilibrium does not satisfy the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion, however.
Essentially, the Intuitive Criterion rules out the pooling equilibrium by arguing that the beliefs that support it are unreasonable. This leaves the separating equilbrium for our continued analysis.
The cost of the signal is determined by r (as long as r > W). The higher r is, the more costly the signal will be for the firm that has to pay the director at least r to ensure that bad firms cannot imitate the signal. The following case suggests that hiring reputable directors can reduce the cost of the signal significantly.
Directors with Reputations. Next, we assume that directors come with reputations that have been earned from activities outside the model-from a public history of success and truthful speaking, for example. Directors' reputations act as a type of goodwill-assets that pay dividends to the holders by allowing them to make credible promises that it would not otherwise be possible to make. The promises of "reputable" directors are credible because their reputational capital would be damaged if they did not keep their promises or tell the truth. A director is chosen based on her reputational capital to provide assurance regarding a certain firm attribute, which a particular group of stakeholders care mostly about. We assume that a director suffers damage to her reputation when it is known to these stakeholders that the director accepted a directorship with what these stakeholders consider a bad firm.3 Thus, to protect her own reputation, a director adopts these stakeholders' definition of bad and good firms when deciding whether to accept a directorship. To avoid additional notation, we assume that all of a director's reputational capital is lost when she attaches herself to a bad firm. Thus, we represent by P both the current level of a director's reputation and the punishment she suffers by joining a bad firm. The value of P can vary from director to director but it is always observable to all parties. In fact, P must be observable because it is determined by other people's perceptions.
As in the former case, the director receives compensation W'. In this case, however, we assume that the higher a potential director's reputation is, the higher will be his or her reservation wage (i.e., W(P) is increasing and continuous in P). To be willing to sign on with a firm, a director in this scenario must be compensated for not only her time, but also for any cost associated with a possible loss of reputation should the firm turn out to be a bad firm. Therefore, she will demand a wage of W(P)+ P from a bad firm, and a wage of only W(P) from a good firm. In this equilibrium, the use of directors' reputations reduces the cost of the signal because the reputations make hiring directors more expensive for bad firms, and bad firms will, therefore, be less able to afford the expense associated with mimicking good firms. Because directors with better reputations are likely to demand higher compensation, the new venture must choose from a range of potential directors the one that provides the needed signal at the lowest cost.
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The optimal level of reputation (P*) is achieved when r -P* = W(P*). Hiring a director with a greater reputation will increase the cost of the signal in one way because it will result in a higher reservation wage. However, the greater is the director's reputation, the relatively more expensive he is for a bad firm and therefore the less a good firm needs to rely on burning money to distinguish itself from bad firms.
Straightforward where W'(P*) = dW(P*)/dP*. Therefore, as the profitability of bad firms approaches that of good ones, good firms must employ directors with higher reputations and pay them more. We make two other points about this proposition.
Again, if the signal is too costly to the good firm (i.e., R < W(0)), no signal is given and we return to the more complete market failure. Second, the reputation reduces the cost of signaling and achieves a more efficient solution only if at least some directors are not too costly (i.e., r > W(0)). If reputable directors are too costly for bad firms, the equilibrium will revert to that of Proposition 2. In the equilibrium of this proposition, investments are ex post profitable for stakeholders and if r > W(0), the cost of signaling is lower than in the "burning money" case.
Potential Directors with
Incomplete Information In the previous step, we assumed that a director could obtain full information about firms (i.e., a director could learn the new venture's type with certainty ex ante). Now, we relax this assumption, and assume that a director observes the new venture's type imperfectly. Specifically, we assume that the probability that a director is correct in her assessment is a.4 The probability that a director is mistaken is thus 1 -a. We also assume that all directors have the same information. All potential directors thus have the same views about any given firm's type, so a firm rejected by one director cannot keep "shopping" for a director until it finds one who believes it is a good firm. (1 -a)(1 -y) to be the probability that a new venture is of the good type, conditional on the director's information that it is of the good type. When a = 1 (i.e., directors have complete information), 3 = 1, and when a = 1/2 (i.e., directors have no added information to that of stakeholders), / = y, and therefore y <[3 < 1. Given the potential damage to valuable reputations, reputable directors will demand a premium over their reservation wages to compensate them for the possible loss of reputation, should it turn out that the firm is bad.
Directors
If a is high enough, the use of reputable directors by good firms can reduce the cost of signaling. However, good firms can take advantage of this possibility, only when bad firms cannot afford to compensate 4Without any loss of generality, we will assume that a > 1/2, noting that if a < 1/2 then 1 -a becomes a better predictor, because 1 -a > 1/2. Thus, a = 1/2 implies that the directors cannot add information to that already held by stakeholders. The reader will notice that our assumptions on information here imply that the probability that a director is correct when she believes a firm is good is the same as the probability she is correct when she believes the firm is bad. (In other words, the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors are assumed equal.) This is merely for notational convenience; allowing for different probabilities will require some redefinition of the critical parameters and will be defined below, but will otherwise not affect the analysis. (1 -y)  a(1 -y)+(1 -a)y as the probability that a new venture is bad given that the director's information is that it is of the bad type. We then have the following proposition. An important assumption underlying the result in Proposition 6 was that good firms that could not attract directors would be out of luck and unable to operate. We can change this assumption and allow good firms that were not able to recruit a reputable director a second chance to signal their type by burning money (i.e., they could hire a director and offer him or her a wage of r). If a good firm has such a second chance, the condition r > R(1 -a) + aW* is not relevant. Good firms first try to hire reputable directors. If they fail, they can offer directors a wage of r. In this scenario, in equilibrium, all good new ventures are able to hire directors. However, some lucky bad new ventures will successfully hire directors as well. The contracts offered by good and bad firms when directors have information that they are good must satisfy two conditions: (i) they must be too expensive for bad firms for which directors get correct information to compensate directors for their opportunity costs (including expected damage to their reputations)-this requires W* > r -5P, and (ii) they must compensate directors for their opportunity costs (including expected damage to their reputations) W* > W(P*) + (1 -P)P*.
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Here, the minimal cost of signaling is achieved when r -SP = W(P) + (1 -f)P. Because I/A < 1 and the better the information is (i.e., as a approaches 1) the closer p will be to 1, the condition p > I/A > y is likely to be met when the directors have very good information about firm types. It is worth emphasizing that p and 8 can be close to 1 even for low y if the information is good enough.
With further analysis of the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium of Proposition 6, we can consider the effect on the equilibrium level of reputation, P*, of changes in two critical parameters: the accuracy of the directors' information, a, and the initial proportion of good firms in the population, y.6
Straightforward calculations reveal that: (i) dP*/dy > 0, (ii) dP*/da > 0 when y > 1/2 and dP*/da < 0 when y < 1/2, (iii) dP*/dr > 0, and (iv) if we give the reservation wage the form W(P*) = W + W(P), we can demonstrate that dP*/dW < 0. The first condition indicates that as the proportion of good firms in the population of firms is greater, firms that hire directors will bring in directors with greater reputations. The second condition reveals that the effect of improving directors' information (a) will depend on the initial distribution of types of firms. This is because the effects on 3 and 8 have opposing influences on the equilibrium reputation. Increasing a will increase 3 and 8. The net effect turns on the relative probability of directors seeing a firm as good or bad and this will depend on the initial distribution of types. When good firms are relatively scarce, ' The authors thank James Brander for suggesting the label for this type of equilibrium. Note that this equilibrium is different from the "hybrid" equilibrium (see, Gibbons 1992, pp. 202-205) in which one type of agent chooses a pure strategy and the other chooses to randomize. In the stochastic separating equilibrium, derived here, neither type of agent deliberately randomizes-the random outcomes are determined by chance. separating not good enough stakeholders equilibrium no stakeholders Note. Recall that * y is a director's perceived probability that a randomly selected firm, is good; * p is the updated probability that a firm a director thinks is good, actually is good; * I/A is the ratio of stakeholders' investment to the gain from a good firm; * I/A, y, and P/3 are bounded between zero and one; * p is bounded between y and one. When a = 1/2, /3 = y; when a = 1, / =1. increasing a has a larger effect on 3 than on 8 resulting in a higher equilibrium level of reputation. And when good firms are relatively common (y > 1/2) the reverse is true. The third condition reveals that as the profitability of bad firms approaches that of good ones, good firms will choose directors with higher reputations. The fourth condition suggests that the higher the intercept of the reservation wage of directors, the lower will be the optimal level of reputation. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the quality of the directors' information about firm type on the different equilibria offered in this section.
The equilibrium is supported, in part, by stakeholders' beliefs that any firm with a director with P < P* must be bad. The stochastic-separating equilibrium described here has the appealing property that it allows bad and good firms to coexist in equilibrium. The quality of the directors' information determines the mix of good and bad firms in the population. When directors' information improves, the percentage of good firms in the population rises and P shifts closer to 1 (see Figure 2) In this case, the quality of the information directors have about firm type is so poor that we return to the "burning money" result of Proposition 2, in which good firms pay directors a wage of W* = r, and the reputations of those directors are irrelevant to hiring decisions.
What If the Revenue of a Good Type Is
Lower than That of a Bad Type (i.e., R < r)? In contrast to other adverse selection models, our model does not require that good new ventures be more profitable than others. Unlike investors, some stakeholders may care more about other attributes of the firm such as its employment conditions or environmental standards than they do about its profitability. We therefore recognize that new ventures which 
Summary and Discussion
This paper has attempted a step toward a better understanding of outside directors' signaling rolea role that is especially important for entrepreneurial firms. The model developed here enables us to formally examine not only whether this strategy is feasible and why the signal is credible, but also factors that determine its effectiveness.
Appointing reputable directors is a compelling signaling vehicle, yet it is not always feasible. When directors have incomplete information regarding the new venture type, the directors must take into account the possibility that they misjudged the new venture type. They may decide to reject the offered position, leading to a market failure. The better directors' information is, the less likely the market failure will occur. We have demonstrated that even directors with incomplete information can serve as middlemen, The results derived from our model can also inform the broader signaling literature. We believe that there is something novel in the stochastic-separating equilibrium described here. This type of equilibrium is obtained when the middleman's (the director's) information regarding the firm quality is incomplete. On one hand, the stochastic-separating equilibrium can be seen as a pooling equilibrium because both types of new ventures choose the same action: to offer the directors the wage of W*. On the other hand, it resembles a separating equilibrium in the way that the directors serve to distinguish, to some extent, the good new ventures from the bad. This equilibrium concept may well be applicable in a broader set of models that incorporate signaling through middlemen. It has an important realistic feature in that it permits the coexistence of both high and low types of firms in The results of our analysis have important normative implications for practitioners. The main implication is that by hiring reputable directors, high-quality young firms may enhance their survival prospects. Signaling efforts should be directed towards stakeholders who need to make a large relationshipspecific investment in establishing working relations with the young firms, and whose benefits from these relationships are not expected to be extremely high. However, because we recognize that boards have various roles other than signaling, we do not imply that an entire board should be structured for signaling purposes. Rather, one (or perhaps a few) individual(s) with the relevant reputational capital can be hired as signals. Furthermore, because directors who are more reputable are likely to demand higher compensation, firms should not hire the most reputable director available but the one whose reputation is sufficient to provide the needed signal. Finally, firms should bear in mind that it is not sufficient to hire reputable directors to provide a credible signal. It is also necessary to provide the director with high-quality information regarding the firm. By providing directors the high-quality information, firms can not only increase the probability they will attract stakeholders, but also reduce their signaling cost. The stakeholder could not be doing any better because the signal costs nothing and provides full information. The good new venture is making a positive profit, which would fall to zero if it chooses not to signal because potential stakeholders would infer that it was a bad type and would not sign on. The director's wage of W* cannot be lower than r, because it must prevent the bad type from imitating the signal. This wage must also be higher than the director's reservation wage. Therefore, W* = max(r, W}. The bad firm is shut out of this market and makes zero profits, as the cost of the signal is greater than the revenue it would derive by attracting the stakeholder (i.e., W* > r). The directors will sign on because W* > W. Therefore, every agent is optimizing, and only the good new ventures attract stakeholders. higher then r -P to ensure that the bad type cannot imitate the signal. It must also be higher than W(P) or directors will not participate. Because the good type maximizes its payoff when W* is minimized, it would choose P such that r -P = W(P). Any change in P will cause an increase in W*. The bad new ventures are shut out of this market and make zero profits. They cannot hire a director because the director's wage W* plus the required compensation for the director's potential loss of reputation P is greater than the revenue the bad type would derive by attracting the stakeholder. Directors will sign on with the good firms because W* > W(P). A director's wage of W* must not be lower than r -SP to ensure that directors will not choose to sign on with new ventures that the directors perceive as bad. W* must also not be lower than W(P) + (1 -P)P, otherwise the directors would refuse to participate. Because the good new ventures maximize their payoff when W* is minimized, they would choose P such that r -SP = Wk(P) + (1 -3)P. Therefore, any change in P will cause an increase in W*. The bad firm will offer the same wage if r > W*, otherwise its payoff will be zero. Bad new ventures will successfully hire directors only when the directors erroneously perceive them as good. Therefore, every agent is optimizing. 
